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Introduction
Medical devices encompass nearly every
medical product that does not achieve its
intended purpose through chemical ac-
tion, from the simple (tongue blades) to the
complex (MRI machines), and from the
safe (stethoscopes) to the risky (artificial
hearts) [1,2]. Certain drug–device combi-
nations, such as drug-eluting coronary
stents, are also regulated as devices.
The number and complexity of medical
devices have increased dramatically over
the past several decades, often to the
betterment of patients’ health. Between
1997 and 2006, the value of device sales
roughly doubled to US$123 billion, rep-
resenting a fairly consistent 6% of the
nation’s health care expenditures [3].
The Center for Devices and Radiological
Health (CDRH) at the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) is charged with en-
suring the safety and effectiveness of medical
devices. While a number of serious safety
problems with devices have emerged—the
Dalkon Shield [4], the Bjork-Shiley heart
valve [5], and the Sprint Fidelis defibrillator
lead [6], to name a few—problems with
effectiveness are not as readily apparent once
ad e v i c ei so nt h em a r k e t ,i np a r tb e c a u s e
postmarket efficacy trials of approved devices
are rare. Thus, the burden of ensuring
device effectiveness is heavily weighted
toward premarket evaluation.
In this article, we first review the history
of premarket device regulation at CDRH
and then identify eight addressable weak-
nesses at the FDA level and above that
impede the agency’s ability to review
devices for efficacy, each accompanied
by paradigmatic cases from recent regula-
tory proceedings. Table 1 summarizes
these weaknesses according to the type of
remedial action required. The cases are
intended only to be illustrative and do not
represent a random subset of FDA device
approvals. Because of FDA policies pro-
hibiting the release of data on unapproved
products, we are unable to estimate the
prevalence of these problems. Moreover,
we do not evaluate each of the approxi-
mately 3,000 applications approved or
cleared by CDRH each year. Other
aspects of medical device regulation, such
as postmarketing surveillance, modifica-
tions to already-approved devices, and
manufacturing facility inspection, are be-
yond the scope of this article.
History and Background of
Premarket Device Review
For much of the twentieth century,
medical devices were largely unregulated
and the vast majority were not subject to
any premarket review. To address this
vacuum, in 1976 Congress passed the
landmark Medical Device Amendments
(MDA) to the federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act (FDCA). Its primary pur-
pose was to prevent the distribution of
dangerous and ineffective devices by
creating a comprehensive premarket re-
view mechanism. This was accomplished
by steering new devices through one of
two premarket review procedures —
‘‘premarket approval’’ (PMA) and ‘‘pre-
market notification,’’ the latter often
referred to as ‘‘510(k)’’ after the relevant
section of the FDCA — determined by a
three-tiered scheme that stratifies devices
into ‘‘classes’’ corresponding to their
potential risks (Figure 1) [7,8].
A PMA application is analogous to a
New Drug Application (NDA). Sponsors
must submit valid scientific evidence, gen-
erally based on clinical trials, that directly
establishes safety and efficacy. By contrast,
in a 510(k) submission, a sponsor establishes
that a device is safe and effective by
demonstrating only that the new device is
‘‘substantially equivalent’’ to an existing
(‘‘predicate’’) 510(k) device [9]. Substantial
equivalence is evaluated according to the
intended use of the product and its technological
characteristics [10]. Once a device is cleared
as a 510(k), it may serve as a predicate
device for subsequent 510(k) submissions.
Class III devices are high-risk, or novel,
devices and most require direct demon-
stration of safety and effectiveness through
the PMA pathway. Class II devices present
moderate risks to patients; in most cases,
manufacturers must submit 510(k)s before
marketing. Class I devices are low-risk and
most are currently exempted from any
premarket review [11]; they are subject
only to rudimentary controls such as
product listing and labeling. From fiscal
years 2003–2007, roughly 50,000 devices
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and 71% were class III, II, and I,
respectively (these figures include applica-
tions for postmarket modifications, an
issue not covered in this article). During
this period, 79% of class III devices went
through PMA, with the remaining pro-
ceeding through 510(k) (see Issue 6 below).
Fourteen and 96% of class II and I devices
were 510(k)-exempt, respectively [11].
Lower Approval Standard for
Medical Devices Than for Drugs
(Issue 1)
Regardless of whether the product is
reviewed under PMA or 510(k), by statute
the approval standard for medical devices
is lower than for drugs. Before a new drug
can be marketed, the sponsor must show
‘‘substantial evidence [of effectiveness],’’
[12] whereas the sponsor of a new device
need only demonstrate a ‘‘reasonable
assurance of … safety and effectiveness’’
[13]. In practice, NDAs typically contain
two or more well-controlled clinical studies
[14], whereas for PMA applications, a
single study is the norm [15] and most
510(k)s contain no clinical data [16].
While for drugs, ‘‘uncontrolled studies or
partially controlled studies are not accept-
able as the sole basis for the approval of
claims of effectiveness,’’ [17] for devices,
the regulations permit ‘‘reliance upon
other valid scientific evidence … even in
the absence of well-controlled investiga-
tions’’ [18]. Thus, data that would never
be sufficient to support the approval of a
drug can result in the approval of a device
used to treat the same condition, poten-
tially diverting patients from effective
drugs to less-effective devices.
This concern is not merely theoretical.
Consider the vagus nerve stimulator
(VNS), a surgically implanted device for
treatment-resistant depression. In the only
randomized controlled trial (RCT), the
device did not demonstrate a statistically
significant benefit on the primary measure
of depression at ten weeks (p=0.25) [19].
However, in its PMA application, the
company relied on follow-up data at one
year in which treated patients were
claimed to have improved more than a
non-randomized, unblinded, non-concur-
rent control group (p,0.001); both groups
were also permitted co-interventions. A
psychopharmacology expert in the FDA’s
drug center advised CDRH that, with
similar data for an antidepressant drug,
the center would not have permitted the
filing of an NDA, adding, ‘‘it is artificial to
us to consider one study for a device (that
is negative on face) as sufficient to provide
evidence for regulatory efficacy when we
require positive studies for a drug’’ [20].
While CDRH initially issued a non-
Summary Points
N The number and complexity of medical devices have increased over the past
several decades. A series of recent safety issues have raised public awareness
about shortcomings in the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) regulation of
medical devices.
N We provide a background on medical device premarket review and identify
eight addressable weaknesses in the process.
N These include a lower approval standard than their drug counterparts, excessive
reliance upon a fast-track process, and failure to conduct Congressionally
mandated device classifcations.
N Paradigmatic cases drawn from recent Food and Drug Administration
regulatory proceedings illustrate each weakness.
Table 1. Summary of statutory and regulatory issues, case exemplars, and necessary corrective actions.
Case Exemplar Definitive Action Needed Immediate Shifts in Agency
Discretionary Practices
Problems requiring statutory actions
a
Issue 1 Lower approval standard for
devices than for drugs
Vagus nerve stimulator Amend 21 USC 1 360c to require treatment
devices to meet the same standard as drugs
Insist on higher standards
Issue 3 Disparate technological
characteristics
Transcranial magnetic
stimulation
Repeal 21 USC 1 360c(i)(1)(A)(ii) to prohibit
such comparisons
Conservative application in limited
number of cases
Issue 4 De novo process Transcranial magnetic
stimulation
Repeal 21 USC 1 360c(f)(2) Limited use for only devices which
are low risk
Issue 8 Unique appeal mechanism
for device manufacturers
Intergel adhesion barrier Repeal 21 USC 1 360e(g)(2) Use other established dispute
resolution routes that already exist
for
pharmaceuticals and biologics
Problems requiring regulatory actions
a
Issue 2 Permissive interpretation
of ‘‘same intended use’’
Collagen scaffold Regulation defining criteria for
determining ‘‘same intended use’’
Tighten agency interpretation
of ‘‘same intended use’’
Issue 5 Predicate creep Pathwork tissue of
origin test
See actions for issues 2 and 3 See shifts in agency practice for
issues 2 and 3
Problems requiring changes in discretionary practices
Issue 6 Failure to complete review
of class III 510(k) devices
Intraaortic balloon pump Complete classification of such devices, requiring
PMA applications for those retained in class III
Same as definitive action
Issue 7 Some devices have never
been classified
Heart valve allograft Complete classification of all unclassified
preamendments devices
Same as definitive action
aAlthough these weaknesses are susceptible to shifts in agency discretionary practices, such changes are not sufficient; for consistent and meaningful improvement,
these laws and regulations must be revisited and strengthened.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1000280.t001
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reversed this decision and approved the
device, overruling more than 20 FDA
scientists and officials [20].
Subsequently, the Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services determined that
VNS was not ‘‘reasonable and necessary,’’
the standard for reimbursement under
Medicare. Moreover, it did ‘‘not believe
there is a treatment benefit directly
attributable to VNS’’ [21]. Other third-
party payers have also denied coverage for
this expensive device [22].
Reliance upon Less-Rigorous
Review Mechanisms
Compared to the PMA process, the
510(k) review is ‘‘generally less stringent …
less expensive … [and] faster’’ [11]. The
average total review time for review of
510(k) submissions in fiscal year 2006 was
54 days, whereas for PMA applications it
was 283 days [23]. Unlike PMA applica-
tions, direct evidence of safety and effec-
tiveness is usually not required for 510(k)
submissions [9]; only 10–15% of 510(k)
submissions contain any clinical data [16].
Instead, 510(k) submissions primarily con-
tain performance characteristics compar-
ing a new device to a predicate. In
considering a PMA application, the FDA
may consult with an advisory committee
comprised of non-government experts; this
option is rarely pursued for 510(k) submis-
sions. As the FDA acknowledges, it ‘‘does
not attempt to address all of the issues
[that] would be answered in a PMA in its
review of 510(k)s’’ [9]. Finally, whereas the
FDA has explicit authority to recall or
temporarily suspend marketing of PMA-
approved devices [24], corresponding
statutory language does not exist for
510(k)-cleared devices.
Permissive Interpretation of ‘‘Same
Intended Use’’ (Issue 2)
According to FDA practices subse-
quently codified in the Safe Medical
Devices Act of 1990 (SMDA), a device
must have the same intended use as its
predicate for clearance under the 510(k)
process. However, the intended use of a
product and its labeled indication are not
synonymous [25]. In the absence of a
statutory definition of ‘‘same intended
use,’’ agency practice permits a lenient
interpretation of this term; the agency
asserts that its ‘‘scientific expertise enables
it to exercise considerable discretion in
construing intended uses’’ [9]. In practice,
the FDA has permitted even novel im-
plantable devices to be reviewed under the
510(k) process.
New medical device
Does a predicate device exist?
PMA
application
What class is the predicate device?
De Novo process
Unclassified
Cleared
Class I*
Is the device SE to the predicate?
Class III
510(k)
submission
Has the FDA finalized a rule
requiring a PMA for the
predicate?
Is the predicate device a
class III preamendments
device or SE to such a
device?
Class II* Class III
       Yes
No
No
No
  No
 Yes
Yes
7
    1
1
   6
  1
  2
3
  5
 4
Yes
Figure 1. Schematic representation of medical device premarket review mechanisms.
Note: Issues listed in circles. Issue 8 does not appear in Figure 1. SE, substantially equivalent. * The
1997 FDAMA exempted most class I devices and a small number of class II devices from 510(k)
requirements. J If determined to be not substantially equivalent, the sponsor may submit a PMA
application. Alternatively, a sponsor may request evaluation under the de novo pathway (see text).
D Post-decision scheme not illustrated.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1000280.g001
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gen Scaffold (MCS) is a device implanted
during arthroscopic surgery to replace a
damaged medial meniscus. After consult-
ing with the FDA, which determined that
the MCS belonged in class III [26],
ReGen began a trial to support a PMA
application [27]—a two-year RCT com-
paring partial meniscectomy to partial
meniscectomy with MCS implantation—
with the final patient evaluated in May
2005 [28]. The trial failed to show any
benefit for the MCS on all three primary
clinical endpoints [29,30]. In December
2005, the FDA allowed the company to
shift courses and submit a 510(k) claiming
that the MCS was a surgical mesh. This,
and another 510(k) submitted in December
2006, were both rejected by the agency.
In a third attempt submitted in July
2008, ReGen again claimed the MCS was
substantially equivalent to surgical meshes
(e.g., rotator cuff mesh, anal fistula plug,
hernia repair graft, pelvic floor reconstruc-
tion mesh). However, as an FDA reviewer
pointed out [30], none of these meshes are
implanted in a weight-bearing joint or
intended to facilitate the regrowth of
articular cartilage.
The company downplayed the results of
the RCT and argued that it was entitled to
the less-rigorous review given to the
MCS’s predicate devices. It claimed that
bench testing data (e.g., suture retention
strength and tensile strength) should pro-
vide the primary basis for establishing
substantial equivalence [31]. Articulating
this point before an FDA advisory com-
mittee, the company asserted that the
committee’s decision should be based
upon ‘‘the function of this device as a
surgical mesh … and not the ultimate
clinical outcome’’ [32]. After a favorable
advisory committee review, the FDA
cleared the MCS for commercial distribu-
tion in December 2008.
In September 2009, the FDA released a
preliminary report criticizing its own
handling of the MCS’s premarket review
[27]. The report described a contentious
review process, with the FDA ultimately
acceding to intense pressure from ReGen
and its Congressional advocates by alter-
ing its typical review procedures. Irregu-
larities included unusual involvement of
senior FDA leadership—including the
then-FDA commissioner—in decisions
usually made at lower levels, a shortened
review time, and replacement of several
standing advisory committee members
with clinicians in specialties thought more
likely to favor the device. In addition, the
report described the replacement of the
FDA review team by an FDA official
(thought by the company to be more likely
to be favorably disposed toward the
device) to present the agency’s findings
before the advisory committee. Lastly, the
report described over reliance on the
advisory committee’s recommendation in
clearing the MCS and highlighted dis-
agreement within the agency over the
interpretation of ‘‘same intended use’’
employed in this case. The FDA is
currently reevaluating its clearance of the
MCS. The Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services has proposed denying
reimbursement for the MCS on the
grounds that ‘‘the evidence is adequate
to conclude that the collagen meniscus
implant does not improve health out-
comes’’ [33].
Disparate Technological
Characteristics (Issue 3)
The other criterion for substantial
equivalence, also codified in the SMDA,
relates to the technological characteris-
tics of a new device and its predicate.
Differences in such characteristics do not
preclude a finding of substantial equiva-
lence, as long as the differences do not
raise new issues of safety or effectiveness
[34]. Indeed, 14% of cleared 510(k)
submissions have different technological
characteristics than their predicates [11].
This provision has led to devices acting
as predicates for markedly dissimilar
devices.
For instance, the transcranial magnetic
stimulation (TMS) device is intended to
treat depression by applying a magnetic
field to a specific region of the brain. The
agency permitted TMS to be reviewed
under the 510(k) process with electrocon-
vulsive therapy (ECT) as the predicate
device, even though ECT involves the
administration of electrical currents to
induce a generalized seizure. Despite this
claim of equivalence, the manufacturer,
Neuronetics, provided no information
suggesting it conducted any studies direct-
ly comparing the two devices [35]; instead,
it conducted a nine-week RCT comparing
TMS to a placebo. The difference be-
tween patients treated with active and
sham TMS was clinically minor (1.7 points
on a 60-point scale) and statistically non-
significant (p=0.057); only the post hoc
exclusion of six patients who had met a
priori inclusion criteria yielded statistical
significance (p=0.038) [36,37]. An advi-
sory committee concluded that ‘‘the clin-
ical effect was perhaps marginal, border-
line, questionable, and perhaps a
reasonable person could ask whether there
was an effect at all’’ [38]. The FDA
subsequently determined that TMS was
not substantially equivalent to ECT.
De Novo Process (Issue 4)
However, Neuronetics persisted and
TMS ultimately reached the market via a
relatively obscure premarket review pro-
cedure called the de novo process.
Created in the FDA Modernization Act
of 1997 (FDAMA) as a means to permit
low-risk, novel devices onto the market
without a PMA, it is reserved only for
devices previously denied clearance in
the 510(k) pathway. Under this pathway,
the sponsor of a rejected product may
request clearance without identifying a
predicate device, thus circumventing
another 510(k) or even a PMA [39].
Here, the company requested clearance
for a modified indication identified by a
questionable post hoc analysis [40,41] of
t h en e g a t i v eR C T .I m p o r t a n t l y ,N e u r o -
netics could not have used the de novo
process without the initial 510(k) desig-
nation, which itself was made possible
only by permitting technologically dis-
similar devices to use the 510(k) pathway.
Since the de novo process was created,
52 devices have been cleared through
this pathway [42].
Predicate Creep (Issue 5)
The 510(k) process allows sponsors to
identify a predicate device that was itself
substantially equivalent to another device
that was substantially equivalent to anoth-
er, and so on. This iterative process
permits a scenario in which, over multiple
cycles, a new device can be quite dissimilar
to the original predicate device—so-called
‘‘predicate creep’’ [11,27].
For example, the Pathwork Tissue of
Origin Test, cleared in 2008, is a micro-
array kit that compares the RNA expres-
sion pattern from a tumor with an
unknown primary to the expression pat-
terns of 15 common tumors [43]. This
device’s predicate device was the BioPlex
2200 Medical Decision Support Software,
a software algorithm cleared in 2005 that
assists in diagnosing autoimmune disor-
ders by matching enzyme-linked immu-
noassay results to a database of sera from
patients with autoimmune disorders [44].
This device, in turn, had been declared
substantially equivalent to the Remedi HS
Drug Profiling System, an algorithm-
based diagnostic kit cleared in 1995 that
tests for illicit drugs. Thus, a screening test
for illicit drugs ultimately allowed for the
clearance of a malignancy diagnostic test,
simply because both use computer pro-
grams to compare samples to an existing
database.
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Requirements
When the MDA was enacted, more
than 1,700 types of devices were already in
commercial distribution [45], the so-called
‘‘preamendments’’ devices. Although their
continued marketing was permitted, the
FDA was required to assemble expert
panels to assign them to one of the three
medical device classes, which the FDA
then finalized. The FDA finalized the last
panel recommendations in 1988 [46].
As a result, any class I or II preamend-
ments device could remain on the market
without submitting a 510(k) [47]. Class III
preamendments devices (approximately
8% of preamendments device types [45])
were permitted to remain on the market
until the FDA finalized a rule calling for a
PMA application for that type of device;
until then, these devices could serve as
predicates in subsequent 510(k) submis-
sions for class III devices [8].
Failure to Complete Review of Class
III 510(k) Devices (Issue 6)
With scarce resources and new devices
continually entering the market, the FDA
was slow to call for PMA applications for
these devices. In the 1990 SMDA, Con-
gress expanded the definition of class II to
include some devices previously consid-
ered class III. Thus, Congress required the
agency to revisit the class III preamend-
ments device types still regulated under
510(k) to either reclassify them or issue a
rule requiring a PMA application by
December 1, 1996 [48,49].
We tracked the 135 class III preamend-
ments device types identified by the FDA
in 1994 to establish their current regula-
tory status (Figure 2) [48]. The FDA had
issued regulations for only 5% (seven
types) of these devices at the time of the
1990 SMDA. By the 1996 deadline, it had
complied with the statutory mandate for
only 38% of class III preamendments
devices. At present, the FDA still has not
completed regulatory proceedings for 22
of the original 135 class III preamend-
ments device types (16%), allowing them
to continue to serve as predicate devices
under the 510(k) process. According to a
recent United States Government Ac-
countability Office report [11], two-thirds
of all class III preamendments devices
cleared from FY2003–2007 were implant-
ed, life-sustaining, or posed a significant
risk. Responding to this report, the FDA
recently initiated the process of determin-
ing whether a PMA would be required for
most of the remaining devices [50].
ECT, certain pacemakers and pace-
maker leads, hemodialysis shunts, and
certain cardiopulmonary bypass pumps
are all class III devices still cleared through
the 510(k) pathway. This enabled Neuro-
netics to file a 510(k) submission, rather
than a PMA, for TMS. Intra-aortic
balloon pumps are also class III prea-
mendments devices currently cleared
through the 510(k) pathway, most without
the provision of clinical data [51]. The
devices have been associated with rare but
serious complications, including severe
bleeding, limb ischemia, and death [52].
Some Devices Have Never Been
Classified (Issue 7)
More than 200 types of preamendments
devices have never been placed into class
I, II, or III [53]. Overlooked by the FDA
in the original classification process, these
devices proceed through the 510(k) path-
way using other unclassified devices as
predicates. Examples include silicone pec-
toralis muscle implants, malar implants,
and certain vertebral body internal fixa-
tion devices.
Manufacturer Appeal Mechanisms
Unique to Center for Devices and
Radiologic Health (Issue 8)
In 1997, the FDAMA created a
Medical Devices Dispute Resolution
Panel (MDDRP), an external panel
Figure 2. Class III 510(k) device types not fully reviewed by the FDA, 1976–2009. Note: if a device was later determined to have more than
one indication, the review was considered complete only after all indications had been reviewed.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1000280.g002
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putes between sponsors and the FDA
[ 5 4 ] .T h i sp a n e l ,u n i q u et oC D R H ,
provides a sponsor with another oppor-
tunity to secure a favorable outcome,
even after the FDA has formally rejected
its device. It has been used three times.
T h ef i r s tp r o d u c tt oc o m eb e f o r et h e
MDDRP was Lifecore’s Intergel, a solu-
tion instilled into the peritoneal space
after gynecologic surgery to reduce
postoperative adhesions. Citing a higher
infection rate and questionable clinical
benefit in a placebo-controlled trial, an
advisory committee voted against ap-
proving Intergel in 2000 [55]. The FDA
shortly followed with a non-approvable
decision, prompting Lifecore to request a
MDDRP meeting. In 2001, when pre-
sented with a modified indication and
additional data from an animal safety
study, the panel voted in favor of
approval, which the FDA subsequently
granted (it is not obligated to follow
MDDRP recommendations). Less than
two years later, Lifecore removed Inter-
gel from the market after reports of
repeat operations for pain, foreign body
reactions, and tissue adherence [56].
Discussion
Advances in medical device technolo-
gies have translated into significant im-
provements in the health of patients. Yet
cracks in the device review system may
threaten to undermine this progress. Our
analysis has identified eight specific po-
tential weaknesses in the premarket re-
view process (Table 1). Although each is
considered separately, these weaknesses
often interact with one another. More-
over, three overarching issues provide the
context in which these weaknesses take
place.
First, the 1997 amendments direct the
agency to consider the ‘‘least burden-
some’’ means of showing effectiveness for
devices [57,58], giving the industry re-
course to challenge many requests it
regards as onerous. For example, ReGen
invoked this language when the FDA
considered the unfavorable findings of its
RCT, asserting that because the agency
was ‘‘required to consider the least bur-
densome information necessary to demon-
strate substantial equivalence,’’ an analysis
relying upon the RCT was ‘‘at odds with
the Act’’ [59]. However, even this asser-
tion was incorrect, as the relevant lan-
guage for 510(k)s is only applicable to
situations involving different technological
characteristics (see Issue 3), which did not
apply to ReGen.
Second, user fees paid by the industry
for device review bind the FDA to specific
review time goals [60]. These fees—valued
at roughly $49 million in FY2008 or
approximately one-sixth of the device
review budget [60]—shift the agency from
being merely a regulator to being finan-
cially dependent upon the very industry it
is charged with regulating.
Third, the FDA appears to have
permitted scientific approaches that fall
short of rigorous. Approaches drawn from
the exemplars put forth in this article
include post hoc subgroup analyses [40],
historical [35] and non-concurrent con-
trols [22], and unnecessary unblinding
[22,35]. In addition, the FDA report on
the review of the MCS shows inappropri-
ate involvement in the scientific review
process from Congresspeople and the
then-FDA commissioner [27].
Addressing the eight issues will require,
in our opinion, remedial actions in three
dimensions—legislative, regulatory, and
agency practice—and certain problems will
be susceptible to more than one approach.
On the legislative front, US Congress
should raise the standard for approval of
devices intended to treat diseases to equal
that required for drugs: ‘‘substantial evi-
dence’’ rather than ‘‘reasonable assur-
ance’’ of effectiveness. Such devices should
be subject to the same regulatory scrutiny
as drugs, such as more than one well-
controlled trial. While it is rarely used, the
de novo process is a legislative loophole
that requires tightening. The safety and
effectiveness of devices cleared through
this pathway have been demonstrated in
neither clinical studies nor by reference to
a predicate device. Finally, devices with
different technological characteristics are,
by definition, dissimilar and evaluating
such devices using the 510(k) route is
therefore inappropriate. Congress should
also repeal this statutory provision, steer-
ing such devices toward the PMA route.
With respect to regulation, we believe
the agency should define criteria for ‘‘same
intended use’’ in a more limited manner.
Doing so could prevent certain novel
devices from proceeding through the
510(k) pathway. Furthermore, the agency
should adhere to existing laws and regu-
lations. For example, it should expedi-
tiously complete classification of class III
preamendments devices, as well as all
unclassified devices missed in the initial
classification effort. Shortly thereafter, the
FDA should call for PMA applications for
any device retained in class III.
The existing legislative and regulatory
framework for premarket review inevitably
leaves many crucial decisions open to FDA
interpretation. As the issues reviewed in
this article demonstrate, this discretion has
been applied in an expansive manner
favorable to Industry. CDRH could ad-
dress these weaknesses through shifts in its
discretionary practices, such as insisting on
higher scientific standards, tightening the
interpretation of ‘‘same intended use,’’ and
insisting on more-rigorous review proce-
dures in those cases where the optimal
review pathway is a matter of judgment
rather than law.
Opponents of such changes might argue
that equal treatment of drugs and devices
intended to treat diseases would place an
undue burden upon typically smaller
device companies, potentially keeping
important products from entering the
market. However, as is true for drugs,
larger companies often acquire startups
that produce promising devices. More-
over, the FDA’s mission is to protect the
public health, and allowing questionably
effective products onto the market seems
inconsistent with that mission.
Some might also argue that whereas
drugs are static entities once approved
(indeed, any change in the chemical
nature of the product requires a new
application), devices tend to advance
incrementally. But an existing abbreviated
mechanism – PMA supplements – permits
design changes to be made without unduly
burdening device manufacturers each time
a modification is made.
Methodological issues unique to device
studies—primarily unblinding and sample
size—are often raised as defenses of the
current regulatory regime. The broad
acceptance of this argument creates a
milieu in which unnecessarily lax scientific
standards continue to be accepted [61,62].
Rather than treating these as justifications
for reduced rigor, they should be regarded
as factors to be considered in interpreting
study results.
A series of problems with the FDA’s
premarket regulation of devices at times
appears to permit potentially unsafe or
ineffective devices to reach the market.
Each must be remedied with a mix of
legislative, regulatory, and discretionary
approaches unique to that problem. Most
importantly, CDRH should place its
decisions on a secure evidence base.
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